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ABSTRACT
In the lead up to the 2016 election, fake news often “outperformed” actual news in users’ social media feeds.
This paper attempts to analyze the process in which fake news proliferates social networking sites and
presents a method of understanding and articulating ways in which personalized feeds are shaped by
algorithm-based user feedback. The algorithm systems are embedded programs that analyze past user data
and search history in combination with other users’ searches and history to calculate digital outcomes,
anticipate possible recommendations, and present consumers with feeds that represent their own unique
immersive media environments. Users may tend to believe misinformation or fake news regardless of their
information echo-chamber, but rather as a result of algorithms tailoring cultural artifacts customized to the
user in social media information and distribution systems. Social media platforms create user categories
based on data collected through online behavior as well as data collected offline in “dataveillance” methods.
Further complicating an understanding of information network analysis is the general “invisibility” of the
algorithm in end-user interaction within social networking sites. When consuming digital media on various
digital platforms, users often access media without interrogating how fake news is designed to find its way
into user algorithms and social feeds. This paper analyzes how the algorithm itself should be considered an
immersive media environment that permits users to consume unique media feeds that may affect civic
actions.
Keywords: algorithms, programming, media environments, quantization

As a growing majority of U.S. citizens get some of their news from social media feeds,
many users may be unaware of the technological methods platforms use to organize and
distribute information on these sites (Rader & Gray, 2015; Shearer & Gottfried, 2017). As a
result, this shift in media consumption to digital sources is in conflict with the pitfalls of
potential misinformation campaigns that exist in social feeds. The revelations of Cambridge
Analytica’s “harvesting” of Facebook data (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018), as well as
controversies with YouTube’s recommendation system, provide an opportunity to respond to
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media delivery methods in digital media and social networking sites; users are often unaware that
news media and informative content consumed on social media news feeds or timelines are
uniquely customized to each user’s preferences (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017; Qiu, Oliveira,
Shirazi, Flammini, & Menczer, 2017; Rader & Gray, 2015). To operate at scale, social
networking sites and digital media distribution sites employ various algorithms in their
operations. The algorithm systems are embedded programs that analyze past user data and search
history in combination with other users’ searches and history to calculate digital outcomes,
anticipate possible recommendations, and present consumers with feeds that represent their own
unique immersive media environments. The algorithmic media environment differs from screen
media ecologies by incorporating data collected both online and offline to present consumers
with unique media feeds, advertisements, and the distribution order of media content. Whereas
television, cable, radio, and newspapers provide media abundantly to many consumers, the social
media feed provides a singular, unique media presentation (feed) to each user through a feedback
loop of choices and actions. This paper analyzes how the algorithm itself should be considered
an immersive media environment that permits users to consume unique media feeds that may
affect civic actions.
In the lead-up to the 2016 United States general election, misinformation disguised as
real news “outperformed” factual news in social media feeds (Silverman, 2016). In early 2018, it
was revealed that some of the media reaching millions of users was misinformation provided by
bad actors that manipulated the data provided on social media. At that time, users were made
aware of Macedonian “fake news factories” accused of creating false websites and social media
pages, as well as the indictment of 13 Russian nationals who have been found to have fabricated
events and created posts designed to create civic discord among U.S. citizens (Apuzzo &
LaFraniere, 2018; Subramanian, 2017). Aside from these indictments, the ultimate revelation
comes from whistle-blower Christopher Wylie’s account of Cambridge Analytica’s alleged
“harvesting,” or the storing of long-term user activity, of 87 million users’ data, used to alter the
algorithm of social media feeds, resulting in skewed media diets delivered to affected users
(Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). These revelations bring to light the technical apparatus
underlying social media and news feeds that provide media to hundreds of millions of users.
While many citizens are aware that algorithms exist in digital media spaces, it is unlikely
that users are media literate in the way algorithms operate social media and digital feeds. Since
the algorithm is an advanced mathematical computer program, the average user is at a
knowledgeable disadvantage of how machine thinking, code, and feeds operate, relying on the
trust that platforms act rationally and appropriately. Additionally, the intentional “invisibleness”
of the algorithm further complicates how users can gain awareness of how to “read” their feeds
and act more intentionally (Eslami et al., 2015). By analyzing and humanizing the process in
which algorithms are deployed, media educators, researchers, and especially users can begin to
engage intentionally with social media feeds and reconsider news media consumption.
The explanation of algorithmic processes is not often prioritized in mainstream media and
entertainment. Media narratives about programming and algorithms, as seen in David Fincher
and Aaron Sorkin’s The Social Network (2010), frame algorithms as obtuse equations drawn on
windows and whiteboards that only the “techies” can employ. In the film, we see algorithms
referred to, but not explained, as a piece of code that is unique to each operation. In The Social
Network, the algorithm is the intellectual property that frames the plot of the film, though the
audience is never informed of the underlying functions of the program. The film perpetuates the
persistence of the concept of a “black box” – an opaque, seemingly invisible operation that runs
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behind the scenes of Facebook and other social media sites. Nearly a decade after the film’s
debut, Facebook’s stock value declined because the algorithm permit bad actors to manipulate
the feed’s operation.
If we assume that Facebook, YouTube, and social media sites will continue to provide
media feeds using algorithms while also refusing to reveal transparency of operations, several
questions should be considered in understanding how feeds can, and were, manipulated. If every
user has the same access to Facebook, how did some users alter feeds or create content that they
were sure would be displayed more often? Why are some users capable of manipulating
algorithmic processes while the majority of users simply consume media on feeds? What can we
learn about how the algorithm functions in digital media spaces? Are humans still engaged in
developing algorithms that provide unique feeds to millions of users?
As users have learned about Cambridge Analytica’s data harvesting operation and
YouTube’s recommendation system errors in children’s media, this paper interrogates the
algorithm through several case studies and provides a way for the reader to learn and engage
with digital media feeds that are unique to each user. Algorithms collect, convert, and organize
user actions into data to create unique media environments through various methods of data
collection and data tracking (occasionally referred to as “dataveillance”) of digital media activity
on apps and browsers, as well as tracking data in physical spaces. Additionally, algorithms are
often blamed as the responsible actor in the distribution of misinformation, disinformation and
fake news, even though the algorithm operates automatically in nearly complete indifference to
human users. This paper also analyzes how users interact with their own unique media
environments in which misinformation could make its way to feeds and frame their knowledge
and civic realities. This exploration of how algorithms have impacted people’s information will
encourage educators, practitioners, and scholars to better engage with the phenomenon of digital
news and media distribution operating at scale.
THE QUANTIZED YOU: CREATING THE USER DATA FEEDBACK LOOP
To create unique and immersive feeds for every user, an algorithm requires immense
amounts of user data and metadata (additional data that makes reference to primary data) to
compute and execute its recommendation system. The algorithm on media distribution sites and
social networking feeds are structured on numerical data obtained from user activity and
converted into large equations. As nearly ten hours of a teenager’s typical day is spent on social
media accessing visual, audio, and textual media on mobile, web browsers, and digital
distribution devices like Apple TV (Tsukayama, 2015), teens participate in the customization of
the media they consume. Over the entire length of time a user participates on social media or
media sites, the small actions and digital interactions, such as likes, comments, ratings, reads,
views, and shares, are accumulated into large mathematical databases. Additionally, the metadata
log of this usage captures the time they spend paused on a timeline to watch a video with
subtitles, whether they completed the video, the choice to continue scrolling, switch applications,
interact and respond (reactions), and if they closed the application. Often unconsidered is the
accumulation of data from negative media use, or the time away from the platform. Not
surprisingly, this additional data is collected and captured through the mobile device the teen
carries, which continues to track this data in the form of GPS data accumulated on the device
(found in the Location Services on iOS).
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Digital media platforms are interested in how user datasets are mobilized in order to
better diversify a user experience, exposing members to content outside their comfort zone or to
consider media that would otherwise be unknown to them. Platforms, as defined by Nick
Srnicek, are “digital infrastructures that enable two or more groups to interact” acting as
intermediaries for customers, advertisers, producers, suppliers, and service providers (Srnicek,
2017, p. 43). Platforms also produce media environments that calculate input data to create feeds
or suggestions that are likely to be chosen by the user. For example, the Netflix
Recommendation System uses user data and behaviors to encourage users to engage with Netflix
content through both views and ratings systems.
By allowing users to rate, not only does Netflix improve its data library, but allows the
system to repurpose the data to predict likely choices a viewer may make on the platform.
Netflix explained that it wants members to be aware of how it adapts to their tastes: “This not
only promotes trust in the system, but encourages members to give feedback that will result in
better recommendations” (Amatriain & Basilico, 2012). By combining user data with
preferences and content, Netflix was able to create “genres” of media that may be completely
disparate, but similar in a specific taste to the member. This algorithm was designed to create a
media environment that didn’t just offer the most popular (see: most watched or highest rated) to
users, but rather, customized the content to a genre that suggested material a Netflix member
may likely enjoy and “satisfy members with varying tastes” (ibid).
While Netflix creates genres and unique media suggestions, it could also employ data that
comes from related behavior like browser history, actual shopping purchases, travel, and
connectivity in social networks (friends) and likeliness to receive influence purchases from
peers. By comparison, the algorithms that Cambridge Analytica allegedly employed on
Facebook combined additional data outside of standard user engagement with the platform. The
data collected by Cambridge Analytica was sourced through a seemingly benign online
personality quiz called “This is Your Digital Life.” By accepting usage of the app, Cambridge
Analytica was able to access information on the user, as well as their entire network of friends
and allegedly, their private messages (Frenkel, Rosenberg, & Confessore, 2018). Facebook
currently uses private message data to create customized advertising, but in this case that
collection was harvested by a third party interested in creating even more specific digital
campaigns to shift the feed of the affected users. Data is also collected from physical activities,
such as shopping purchases made with discount or membership cards as that are connected to
your cell phone or email address (Stern, 2018). This collection, occasionally referred to as
“dataveillance,” is part of modern digital advertising methods that are interested in how to
balance and integrate marketing into media. The more cumulative the data acquired, the more
accurate the suggestion to users, and the more likely the user stays on the platform and makes
informed consumption decisions.
The data collected are combined to create personality profiles, or so-called psychographs,
a portmanteau of psychology and demographics that organizes user data into behaviors that fit in
the “big five” of traits: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and
neuroticism (also known as OCEAN) (Martínez, 2018). This digital accumulation of data has
been well known for years and well discussed after the 2013 Snowden revelations and the 2012
“emotional contagion study” (explained later in this paper). To encourage more intentional and
civic use on digital media platforms, users should actively consider how information is collected
and quantized to build these psychographs.
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If we are to consider the algorithm as media environment, we should also consider how
the pathway from the user to the feedback system occurs as filtered through the machine
processes. Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci explains that we are entering “the era of judging
machines” (Tufekci, 2014). These machines “calculate not just how to quickly sort a database, or
perform a mathematical calculation, but to decide what is ‘best,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘appropriate,’ or
‘harmful’” to users (ibid). Tufekci’s analyses of algorithms over the last decade are invaluable to
digital media literacy practitioners, educators, and scholars as users continually interact with
media in new ways on different platforms. For a platform to better anticipate our interests and
our tastes, it has to better know our personality as created through data.
In her 2017 TED Talk, Tufekci explains that user data is quantized with “every status
update you ever typed, every Messenger conversation, every place you logged in from, all your
photographs that you uploaded there. If you start typing something and change your mind and
delete it, Facebook keeps those and analyzes them, too. Increasingly, it tries to match you with
your offline data” (Tufekci, 2017). Users are likely aware of the data they create each day
through posts, comments, text messages, and uploads, but likely do not take into consideration
the amount of negative media, or the media that is deleted before it was posted, is also quantized.
This means that both posted and non-posted media on social media and search platforms is
logged as user data. Facebook, among several other platforms, will merge the digital data with
offline data and sell your profile to advertisers. This is often why users find seemingly
coincidental advertising in their feeds that align with purchases or conversations that occur
offline.
Overall, the goal of the algorithmic feed or search results is to create a media
environment that best suits each user’s preferences. In the traditional media environment,
television viewers or newspaper readers were subject to advertising likely somewhat unrelated to
their specific desires. In a world of big data and algorithms, the feeds and results now streamline
the experience for both the advertiser and the user. The advertiser now uses the user profiles to
sell specific products and, as an added benefit, the user gains access to material they were
previously unaware existed. Digital media consumption, from content to advertising, is thus
unique to each user.
THE AMBIVALENT MACHINE
To operate at the scale of over a billion simultaneous users, YouTube operates its feed
with the algorithm-based recommendation system. As the algorithm is operating so vastly and
globally, it cannot always account for exploits in the hundreds of hours of content uploaded
every minute. This technological oversight can lead to feed manipulation, dangerous content
bypassing the filters, and potentially the weaponization of media content. In June 2017, a
moderator of a subreddit forum expressed concern over a possible algorithmic exploit involving
YouTube children’s content. The forum known as r/ElsaGate had been investigating a strange
shift in how children’s content was being prioritized in the YouTube algorithm. Disturbing
videos disguised as children’s videos were being recommended after clips like “Peppa Pig” or
“Surprise Egg” or nursery rhyme videos were played. In the nursery rhymes category, several
recommended videos played pleasant and catchy music behind cartoon clips of Spiderman and
Elsa (from Disney’s 2013 Frozen) drinking beer or aggressively arguing with one another. This
material received hundreds of thousands of views, likely by children using one of their parent’s
devices. In his extensive 2017 article “Something is Wrong with the Internet,” James Bridle
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describes a situation where videos are being used to “systematically frighten, and abuse children,
automatically and at scale” (Bridle, 2017).
The algorithm behind YouTube recommendations is based on deep learning and
scalability embedded in its algorithms. YouTube employs Google Brain, the deep neural network
systems that operate the massive amounts of video on YouTube, filter fresh content, and
organize media based on signal-to-noise ratios (Covington, Adams, & Sargin, 2016). Neural
networks are machine-learning technologies that act similar to the way a human brain thinks,
creating new pathways to create better machine efficiency. While YouTube originally operated
its feed with human curators, its current massive iteration requires large-scale algorithmic
functions. Unfortunately, this leads to the aforementioned exploits during the “#ElsaGate”
controversy. YouTube’s goal is similar to that of Facebook’s and other algorithmically operated
social media platforms: increase time spent on the platform. For users with a healthy skepticism
and keen approach to media content, the algorithm works well enough, but user intervention
continues to drive media choices. The same framework does not extend to children.
Over the last several years, YouTube had shifted its monetization rules to prioritize
content for children. Though the company consistently explains that YouTube is not a platform
for children and produced a separate children’s app, it’s been found to have exploited user data
of children in a recent FTC filing (Maheshwari, 2018). The “#ElsaGate” controversy led to
hundreds of advertisers leaving YouTube and outcry from concerned parents. YouTube CEO
Susan Wojcicki explained in a formal YouTube blog post that “bad actors are exploiting our
openness to mislead, manipulate, harass or even harm” (Wojcicki, 2017). Wojcicki stated that
YouTube would be adding 10,000 human moderators to assist in monitoring this activity.
Another example of the algorithm being exploited occurred in the early Monday morning
hours after the horrific mass shooting in Las Vegas in October 2017. When users sought
information on the suspect, Google’s search results posted several 4Chan threads in the search
results. 4Chan, specifically its “random” board, /b/, had created several wild and incorrect
speculations as to who the shooter was the previous night. The search results were exploited
when the algorithm mistook the threads as authoritative information due to the collection of links
embedded in its thread (Turton, 2017). How an inaccurate forum thread, especially from a site
well known for its internet trolls and bad actors, appeared in the top results explains how
algorithms prioritize information outcomes, but also offers insight into the operations of the
code. If algorithms operate fairly autonomously, then it is important to consider how the machine
operates.
In his October 2017 article “The Algorithm is Innocent,” William Turton explains that
Google, YouTube, and Facebook consistently deflect blame onto the algorithm “as if they don’t
control their own code” (Turton, 2017). The algorithm is a code-based program that merely
executes its commands. As companies deflect blame from the human actors to the machine, the
algorithm is further scapegoated. This allows the concept of the algorithm to be separate from the
actions of the coders, executives, and platform personnel who can continue to operate the system
without much human intervention. The “#ElsaGate” controversy and the 4Chan misinformation
campaign are examples of many recent events that seek to blame the algorithm because in many
ways, even the computer programmers are unaware of the vulnerabilities of a system until
someone (or something) attempts to test the operations. As algorithms capture us implicitly (to
borrow a computational term), the blame on the machine is suspect.
Blaming the algorithm further obfuscates the potential ways in which we can respond to
the media environments that are created by the algorithmic outcomes. Algorithms are pieces of
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code that are written by coders – human operators who ingrain their intellect and talent into the
program. Code is assumed to be structurally cold, but is actually imbued with the agenda, biases,
and vulnerabilities of the programmer. In a concrete example, Facebook employed a “Year in
Review” highlight video algorithm at the end of 2014. The site automatically generated a video
post that aggregated the images and videos with the most likes of that year. To many, a
refreshing recap, but to web designer Eric Meyer, it was an act of “inadvertent algorithmic
cruelty” (E. Meyer, 2014). Meyer had lost his daughter earlier that year and Facebook had
generated his “Year in Review,” which included posts regarding her death – surrounded by
animated balloons and confetti.
As a web designer, Meyer was aware that algorithms are thoughtless, but had been
affected by its actions nonetheless. Meyer’s auto-generated result was not an isolated incident
and many users were presented with “Year in Review” reminders of family tragedies, mishaps,
or lost pets. Jonathan Gheller, Facebook’s product manager of the “Year in Review” app,
responded to Meyer’s blog post about his daughter and apologized and shed some light on the
process. Facebook programmers often lead lives of privilege in a Silicon Valley cultural bubble.
The coders and programmers of the “Year in Review” app may not encounter events of the
common user during their year and lose sight of how many people may utilize the platform. This
technological privilege is often hidden or disregarded as the algorithm bears the brunt of the
blame.
The algorithm merely executes code. It is an ambivalent machine that has humans on
either end: the programmer and the end-user. The platform acts as the interactive mediator and
media host, but as few program the code to be used by many, it is likely difficult to anticipate
potentially tragic or inappropriate outcomes. Interrogating the algorithm and considering how it
operates allows users to potentially understand the intentions of the system. As platforms
continue to scale, they have to simultaneously appeal to general users and the varied niche
audience groups, while also producing unique feeds for every user. While platforms like
Facebook, YouTube, and Google may act as sources of user-generated content, they actually
reproduce the politics and culture of the system or programmer. In his book What Algorithms
Want: Imagination in the Age of Computing, Ed Finn argues that the algorithm acts as a “culture
machine” as the complexity of the machine interacts with humans (Finn, 2017). Finn explains
that we “imagine these algorithms as elegant, simple, and efficient, but they are sprawling
assemblages involving many forms of human labor, material resources, and ideological choices”
(Finn, 2017, p. 28).
THE IMMERSIVE MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS
In comparison to media ecology, the algorithm exceeds the screen interaction of the user.
Algorithms create feeds based on combinations of thousands of inputs from the larger audience
and the specific user actions both on and off the platform. Considering the algorithm as a media
environment means to come to an understanding that future platform interactions will disregard
legacy consumption methods of collective, meaning mass, media ecologies and move beyond
traditional media literacy approaches to deconstruction and analysis. The algorithmic media
environment is a custom, unique environment that changes as the user changes, but also with the
culture surrounding the user. This is a massive shift in how media is experienced by the many as
media is distributed both massively and uniquely.
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While reading a newspaper or consuming television, the viewer is unable to shift the
content from the platform level. The reader could turn the page or change the channel, but the
content is pre-determined by the publisher or the channel. By reacting to an article or a television
show, the next page or the following program does not automatically change – it is static and
predetermined. While the choices may shift over a period of months or years, the content shift
would require subscribers to make conscious consumption choices of unsubscribing or changing
providers. In the digital platform space, a choice made on a piece of content changes the material
almost immediately following the action. If a user is on the news app on their mobile device,
they may notice the short load time as they scroll. Within those few milliseconds, the feed has
shifted, albeit slightly, to accommodate the user’s likely desires. Within just a few hours of using
an app like Twitter, Netflix, Facebook, or the news app, the feed is customized to the user, based
on the choices of what was read, ignored, or reacted to, and combined with the aforementioned
collected data in physical spaces. The user is reproduced in their own media environment.
The algorithm works best when platforms prioritize time spent on their site as well as
traffic to and from the site. This allows cookies, small pieces of tracking software, to be installed
from the browser to the user’s computer. The traffic helps determine what is considered a
“popular post” or should be prioritized in each unique feed and also contributes to post visibility
on other feeds, which in turn could contribute to a post’s possible “virality,” or likelihood to be
shared (Oremus, 2016). For example, the style of “clickbait” headlines has shifted over the years
as a direct result of user interactions, clicks, shares, and algorithm tweaks. Sites like HuffPost or
Upworthy shifted their headline text to lure visitors to their site and, in turn, share the link again
(R. Meyer, 2013). As a result, the algorithm shifts to prioritize links that are clickable and
possibly malicious, rather than factual data-based headlines.
In an extreme, though concrete example, Dylann Roof’s murderous act was predicated by
his radicalization into white nationalism through his internet habits (Hatewatch Staff, 2015). In
the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) investigation into Roof’s heinous hate crime of
murdering nine African-American citizens in a historic black church in Charleston, South
Carolina in 2015, the SPLC discovered traces of his radicalization through Google search results.
In his online manifesto, Roof explained that he was affected by the Trayvon Martin case in 2012.
Martin was fatally shot by George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch volunteer, in Sanford,
Florida. The highly controversial case resulted in an acquittal for Zimmerman on self-defense
grounds. In his manifesto, Roof writes that he was prompted “to type in the words ‘black on
White crime’ into Google, and I have never been the same since that day” (ibid). The Google
results prioritized the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC) as the first link, due the nature of
data included in the site. While the CCC site is extremely biased and omits important data, this
algorithmic technique is known most commonly as search engine optimization, or SEO, where
the title, content, and links allow sites to move up and down the search ranks.
Roof’s life may have changed due to the nature of the content on the CCC site, but more
importantly, simply clicking on the link permanently altered his media environment. As soon as
the CCC site loaded, the malicious site’s cookies were downloaded on Roof’s hard drive. The
next time Dylann Roof made a Google search in a similar category, it used his previous search
history to inform his results. As Roof sought out information to confirm his biases, the search
results customized, displaying a unique media feed for Roof that persisted across various digital
platforms. As he made new conscious purchasing decisions, communicated in new forums, the
search algorithm did not react to his behavior by neutralization, but rather more specific and
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narrower results. Rather than being exposed to the likely multi-dimensional points of view
available on traditional spaces, Roof became further radicalized by his search results.
In theory, Google should have provided a more factual site as the first result, perhaps
from the FBI crime statistics page. If this had happened, Roof may have had a chance to debunk
his confirmation bias rather than immediately consider the truth to be certified by his predisposed
thoughts. This personalization of media is consequential and results in unique feeds for every
user. Even if two users have identical friends and connections, the search results will be unique
based on their previous interaction with the system and the actions in their personal life (Bozdag,
2013). This media environment extends beyond the monocultural filter bubble or echo chamber,
to entire media eco-systems. This “echo-system” is all-encompassing and persists into the feeds
of the network of friends or users in the connective environment. For example, the Facebook
News Feed curation algorithm employs 100,000 factors to customize the feed of any given user,
doing more to omit content rather than include it (Eslami et al., 2015). This feed personalization
is a selective environment that results in the display of content deemed worthwhile to the user, in
order to increase the time spent online.
The personalization algorithm that creates these unique platform media environments are
multi-nodal sourcing from the user history, user preferences, location data, level of novelty,
personal networks and the advertisers (Bozdag, 2013). In the consumption of the feeds, users are
presented with the illusion of a qualitative experience of information flows, thereby lacking the
desire to critically examine or respond to the methods in which the media environment was
produced.
HUMANIZING THE ALGORITHM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIA LITERACY PRACTICE
Just two days after Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral win of the U.S. presidency, Alexander
Nix of Cambridge Analytica praised his company’s “revolutionary approach to data-driven
communication” and how it “played such an integral part in President-elect Trump's
extraordinary win” (Grassengger & Krogerus, 2017). At the time, users were unaware that much
of their data had been allegedly harvested and kept by Cambridge Analytica for extended periods
of time, in order to evaluate the likelihood of civic actions. In the month before the 2016
election, Brad Parscale, Donald Trump’s digital media director, had used the harvested data to
create “dark posts” – posts that exist solely in unique media environments, seen only by specific
users, and do not archive (Green & Issenberg, 2016). Parscale’s goal was to affect civic action,
and in the case of the posts created in 2016, to discourage communities from voting by using
Facebook’s News Feed to promote distrust in Hillary Clinton. The awareness of this type of
media manipulation dates back to the 2012 “[e]xperimental evidence of massive-scale emotional
contagion through social networks” study where 689,003 1 feeds were altered to find that
“emotional states can be transferred to others” without their direct awareness (Kramer, Guillory,
& Hancock, 2014, p. 8788).
The emotional contagion experiment analyzed how users express emotion on Facebook
feeds. The researchers had access to the Facebook ranking algorithm and over the course of one
week in January 2012, the researchers found that when positive material was omitted from their
1

Participants were randomly selected based on their User ID, resulting in a total of about 155,000
participants per condition who posted at least one status update during the experimental period (Kramer,
Guillory, & Hancock, 2014).

147

J. Cohen | Journal of Media Literacy Education 2018 10(2), 139 - 151

News Feeds, users reacted by posting more negative content, and more surprisingly, caused
negative responses from their network of friends. In the words of the researchers, “The results
show emotional contagion” (Kramer et al., 2014, p. 8789). The harvesting of data by Cambridge
Analytica was likely informed by this study, as well as the ability to understand how users
interact, share, and express themselves on social media. By comparison, the Cambridge
Analytica data collection likely affected 87 million users.
As Ed Finn states near the conclusion of What Algorithms Want, “Canons, literary fields,
even individual books are no longer the stable intellectual entities they once were, as the
institutions involved in their preservation and study undergo the same rapid technological
changes affecting the rest of the algorithmic ocean” (Finn, 2017, p. 193). Mathematician Cathy
O’Neil explains that ignorance of algorithms is a “crucial piece of the puzzle” for advertisers and
the opaque nature of the system is by design (O’Neil, 2016, p. 72). Media literacy focuses on
deconstruction, interpretation, and analysis of media consumption choices, but in the age of
unique media environments, a more humanizing approach to media literacy education might
consider the implications of new challenges encountered by algorithmic media distribution.
As platforms continue to scale and media is almost entirely digitally distributed, new
lessons will be learned only after each exploitation of the algorithm. Digital media literacy needs
to wrestle with methods of exploring and interrogating the algorithm because actors interested
creating widespread “information cascades” are aware of how users receive and interact with
unique media environments (Del Vicario et al., 2016). Media literacy educators, practitioners,
and scholars have the responsibility to promote important concepts and methods of interrogating
the algorithm, platform capitalism, and misinformation campaigns, while simultaneously
encouraging increased attention to user habits and knowledge of data collection and
dataveillance.
Contemporary media literacy education could incorporate new methods of reading and
interpreting feeds by understanding the multiple ways user actions are converted into algorithmic
tools. While intentional use is covered in media literacy education, students should also be made
aware of how social media platforms and digital distribution outlets use the algorithm to increase
time spent online by incorporating the collection, quantization, and repurposing of user data,
including most importantly, the “negative” media data activity, or the time calculated off the
platform. Activity away from digital media no longer equates to non-use, but is part of the usermedia feedback echo-system. In addition to this, students should be considerate of how
personality traits are derived and converted into so-called psychographs and deployed in the
algorithm as the feed uses these traits to shape our media diets.
Just as media literacy recognizes the point of view of the author and creator,
contemporary media literacy education needs to be more intentionally situated in humanizing
digital media, so as to interrogate the programmers’ intention and possible shortsighted
deployments. While the algorithm may be ambivalently executing its operations, the intentions
(biases, perspectives, goals) of the programmer should be analyzed. Digital misinformation is
insidious in online social media and threatens civic action and democracy as the unique media
environments often result in polarization rather than cohesion. Operationalizing media literacy to
consider the algorithm as media environment prepares for citizens a way to imagine digital
media platforms distinctly from collective media distribution.
Using this framework set forth in this paper, users are empowered to consider how
unique media environments are presented to them intentionally but consumed unconsciously. In
interrogating, analyzing, and humanizing the many aspects of our digital echo-systems, we can

148

J. Cohen | Journal of Media Literacy Education 2018 10(2), 139 - 151

respond to our growing oversaturated data feedback environment and prepare for an even more
digital future.
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